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This paper is aimed at clarifying one particular aspect of Derek Bickerton’s 
recent contribution to Biolinguistics (Bickerton 2014a), where he contends that 
biolinguists tend to emphasize the specifics of certain non-standard evolution-
ary models in order to prejudicially avoid the theory of natural selection. 
According to Bickerton (2014a: 78), “they [biolinguists] have problems with the 
notion of natural selection, up to and including a total failure to comprehend 
what is and how it works”. This is the most understandable, also according to 
Bickerton, because even evolutionary psychologists and philosophers like 
Pinker and Dennett, who have devoted well-known papers and books to 
explaining and applying natural selection to the case of cognition and lang-
uage, have failed to understand the real import of Darwin’s idea: “Natural 
selection could not ‘explain’ complex design”, claims Bickerton (2014a: 79), 
“even if Pinker & Bloom (1990), Dennett (1995), and others who are not biolo-
gists think it does. In fact, natural selection does not provide a single one of the 
factors that go into creating design”.   
 Bickerton’s comments in the Biolinguistics piece are specifically targeted 
at the model of ‘self-organization’ associated to complexity sciences, which is 
introduced in Longa (2001) as potentially capable of dealing with some recalci-
trant problems of the evolution of language. Bickerton (2014a: 79) writes that 
Longa’s attacks point to “a straw man”, and that his claim that self-organi-
zation is an alternative to natural selection is “a category mistake”, for self-
organization is simply one of the factors that generates the variation that 
natural selection selects from. So, according to Bickerton, natural selection and 
self-organization must be conceptualized as two complementary mechanisms 
that operate in a coordinated manner to bring about complex biological 
designs. 
 In this response we want to explain that this is a wrong conclusion 
supported on wrong premises. For that purpose, we first document that bio-
logists generally agree on the idea that natural selection creates design; second, 
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we explain that self-organization is primarily concerned in the stability and 
robustness of form rather than in introducing variation; and, finally, we 
systematize the differences between self-organization and selection as 
explanatory paradigms. Considering all these pieces of evidence altogether, we 
conclude that they cannot be conceptualized as coordinated evolutionary 
strategies, save at the price of making one or another devoid of its original 
meaning. As a matter of fact, we think that this is exactly the position of 
Bickerton, to whom ‘natural selection’ boils down to the idea of the ‘survival of 
the fittest’. But if so, we agree with Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini (2010: 139ff.) 
that natural selection becomes a platitude: “There survive those that survive”.1 
At the end of this response we offer a good illustration of the possibility of 
respecting the difference between natural selection and self-organization for 
explanatory purposes, curiously enough taken from Bickerton (2014b). 
 
2. Natural Selection: The Biologists’ View 
 
According to Bickerton’s presentation, natural selection does not create design: 
Natural selection simply selects among designs independently created by 
other means—self-organization being just one (Bickerton 2014a: 79). 
Consequently, we ought not to present natural selection and, for example, self-
organization as rival evolutionary mechanisms, because they are comple-
mentary pieces or a single multifaceted process. This is not what the relevant 
specialized literature shows (see Table 1), for there one can easily find what is 
characterized as the ‘creative view’ of natural selection (Razeto-Barry & Frick 
2011, Razeto-Barry 2013). According to Razeto-Barry and Frick’s presentation, 
natural selection “is a creative force because it can generate new traits by the 
cumulative selection that makes probable a combination of mutations which 
are necessary for trait development and that would not probably be combined 
together without natural selection” (Razeto-Barry & Frick 2011: 344). As a 
matter of fact, such a characterization is an unavoidable one if we take the neo-
Darwinist dissection of the evolutionary process at face value. As Gould (2002: 
141-146) explains, the variation on which natural selection acts is small, 
copious and isotropic (i.e. insensitive to direction). Consequently, “variation 
only serves as a prerequisite, a source of raw material incapable of imparting 
direction or generating evolutionary change by itself” (Gould 2002: 155). In 
other words, such raw material is only creatively cooked by selection.2 
                                                
    1 According to an anonymous reviewer, this phrase is an epitome of the creationists’ creed, 
a fact we were not aware of when we originally wrote it. Be as it may, we consider this 
observation irrelevant to the point. Some biologists have previously defended the thesis 
that natural selection entails a tautology (for example, Vallejo 1998), without aiming it at 
supporting creationism. For that matter, one might also correctly say that Darwin’s con-
cept of adaptation was continuous with that of theologians. Obviously enough, from this 
fact one cannot derive an argument supporting Darwin’s intimate beliefs. The same 
reviewer notes that Bickerton nowhere mentions ‘survival’ or ‘fitness’ in his paper. This 
is correct, but if it means that Bickerton sees these concepts alien to the theory of natural 
selection, readers may wonder what natural selection actually boils down to for him. 
    2 A reviewer suggests that supporters of the creative view clearly reify and anthropomor-
phize evolution, envisioning it as an agent with abilities proper of intentional minds. This 
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According to Gould, it was one of Darwin’s key postulates “the claim that 
natural selection acts as the creative force of evolutionary change” (Gould 
2002: 583). We think that Gould (and Darwin, for that matter) is not suspect of 
being one of those non-biologists that failed to comprehend what natural 
selection is and how it works. 
 
“Selection molds the separate units of heredity into a coordinated whole, a process as 
truly creative (although of course not planned or directed) as the combination of 
separate bricks into a building.”          (Simpson et al. 1957: 413) 
“All evolution is due to the accumulation of small genetic changes, guided by natural 
selection.”                      (Mayr 1963: 586) 
“Natural selection is at one and the same time a blind and a creative process.” 
(Dobzhansky 1973: 126) 
“Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is satisfying because it shows us a 
way in which simplicity could change into complexity, how unordered atoms could 
group themselves into ever more complex patterns.”       (Dawkins 2006 [1976]: 12) 
“We start from the presumption that natural selection is the only plausible explanation 
for adaptive design.”          (Maynard-Smith & Szathmáry 1995: 290) 
“Selection thus acts as a creative force that has made possible biological organizations 
that would otherwise have been highly improbable.”      (Strickberger 2000: 136) 
“It is the cumulative selection (‘adding up,’ in Darwin’s terms) of variation that forges 
complexity and diversity.”                (Carroll 2006: 32) 
“As a consequence of natural selection, organisms exhibit design, that is, exhibit 
adaptive organs and functions.”            (Ayala 2007: 8570) 
“Complexity cannot evolve except by natural selection.”      (Futuyma 2009: 296) 
Table 1. Natural selection: The creative view 
 
3. Self-Organization: The Complexity Scientists’ View 
 
Complexity Sciences aim at discovering laws of form capable of offering 
models for patterns of order and regularities found in nature. The laws of 
concern are alien to external pressures (as for example, to adaptive pressures), 
but obey intrinsic generative principles that induce organization on matter in a 
self-sufficient way. They are typical of dynamic complex systems, composed of 
an intricate net of interacting elements, capable of abruptly and spontaneously 
reaching ordered patterns of organization. From a logical point of view, such 
systems could attain many different positions within a space of possibilities, 
but they place themselves in a well-defined area (‘at the edge of chaos’), where 
self-organization arises. 
                                                
argument has been recently elaborated and directed against contemporary Darwinists in 
Fodor & Piattelli-Palmarini (2010) and Richards (2012) explains that it is correct at least of 
Darwin’s original formulations of the idea of natural selection. From the Darwinist side, 
philosophers however argue that the very properties emphasized by Gould guarantee 
that it is a ‘stupid’ process (Dennett 1995), incapable of planning, looking ahead, and 
other intelligent qualities, notwithstanding being creative. 
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 This short presentation may be enough to appreciate that self-
organization is not really the best of the allies of variation, for one of its main 
properties is anisotropy (i.e. directionally biased). Besides, self-organization 
produces steady and robust patterns of combined elements, not in competition 
with slightly different concurrent patterns. Obviously enough, forms thus 
generated may not be particularly fitted to survive in a given environment, 
and so they may be rejected and disappear from it. But this is not natural 
selection positively acting on raw materials, but a negative filter disposing of 
independently cooked ones. 
 Readers can contrast the accuracy of this short presentation, enough for 
our purpose, in the following sources: Lewin (1992), Waldrop (1992), Goodwin 
(1994), Kauffman (1995), Stewart (1999), Solé & Goodwin (2000), Camazine et 
al. (2001), Johnson (2001), Longa (2001), Gribbin (2004), Edelmann & Denton 
(2007), and Heylighen (2008). 
 
4. Self-Organization and Natural Selection: A Short Summary of Differences 
 
The following is a list of a total of eight differences between natural selection 
and self-organization that reflects that they cannot be conflated into a unique 
mechanism: They are complete explanatory frameworks on their own, each 
incompatible with the other in particular applications (see Table 2). Of course, 
they may be thought of as particularly fitted to different aspects of organic 
designs (see section 5), but successfully applying one of them in a particular 
occasion automatically renders the other inadequate for the same goal. 
 
Natural selection (NS) Self-organization (SO) 
NS is gradual. SO is abrupt. 
NS is positively creative. Selection after SO is negatively rejective. 
Order is accidentally induced by tinkering. Order is induced by intrinsic inertias. 
NS is an externally guided process. SO is an internally guided process. 
NS acts on passive matter. SO happens in active matter. 
NS’s outcomes are open. SO’s outcomes are fixed. 
NS is historically contingent. SO is generatively necessary. 
NS is gene centered. SO is epigenetic. 
Table 2. Natural selection and self-organization: A case of incompatibility of character. 
 
 The table is eloquent enough and justifies Edelmann & Denton’s 
conclusion:  
 
Self-organization is […] totally different in essence from cumulative 
selection as a causal agent of bio-complexity. If self-organization is in fact 
widely exploited by organisms to generate adaptive complexity […] then 
this does indeed provide a serious challenge to the Darwinian claim that 
cumulative selection is the major creative agency in evolution. 
(Edelmann & Denton 2007: 598) 
 
 Let us to dwell a little more on the list. 
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4.1. Gradual vs. Abrupt Character 
According to Gould, gradualism “may represent the most central conviction 
residing both within and behind all Darwin’s thought” (Gould 2002: 148), for 
otherwise variation itself, and not selection, should be deemed the true agent 
of evolutionary change. From the point of view of Darwinism, “creativity must 
reside in the summation of [the tiny increment of each step],” with natural 
selection acting “as the agent of accumulation” (Gould 2002: 150). Dawkins 
also points out that denying gradualism entails “to deny the very heart of 
[Darwinian] evolution theory” (Dawkins 1986: 318). 
 Self-organization operates on a radically different basis, which 
Edelmann & Denton explain in the following way: 
 
The realm of self-organized complexity is an unpredictable realm of 
sudden spontaneous emergent complexity that is generated by non-linear 
interactions via something like a phase transition. This is a realm where 
saltation, emergence, spontaneous sudden change and bifurcations rule; a 
realm in which the concepts of intermediacy, gradualism and continuity, 
so central to the Darwinian, no longer apply.  
(Edelmann & Denton 2007: 585)  
 
4.2. Positive vs. Negative Selection 
Natural selection acts positively inducing order and consistency upon a 
material that would otherwise diversify to the point of making populations 
amorphous collections of mutually unrecognizable individuals. On the 
contrary, self-organization guarantees similar outcomes without the need of 
selecting among competing designs. This does not entail that a parallel guaran-
tee exists that self-organized designs are automatically sanctioned to overcome 
the perils of every imaginable environment. However, self-organized struc-
tures are simply ‘selected’, not ‘naturally selected’, for they are subject to a 
negative or filtering process of rejection, different from the source that inde-
pendently creates them. The idea can be traced back, for example, to the works 
of Richard Owen, who favored an idea of ‘natural rejection’ along these lines 
as an alternative to Darwin’s natural selection (Owen 1860). The following 
fragments offer more recent formulations of the idea: 
 
[Selection] does not have a lot to do except act as a coarse filter that rejects 
the utter failures.              (Goodwin 1994: 157)  
 
Self-organized material patterns may be selected by, but not created by 
natural selection.            (Edelmann & Denton 2007: 598)  
 
4.3. Tinkering vs. Generative Inertias 
The expression ‘tinkering’ is customarily used to express the opportunistic 
character of natural selection, which manages to take advantage of any 
haphazardly occurring variant within the range of a population. Tinkering is 
thus the resource that natural selection has at hand to accidentally impose 
order where otherwise “there would be nothing but incoherent disorder” 
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(Kauffman 1995: 8). Instead, self-organization derives order from inner 
generative laws, internal to the organism, so from this perspective, “vast veins 
of spontaneous [not accidental] order lie at hand” (Kauffman 1995: 8; the insert 
is also from Kauffman, same page). 
 
4.4. External vs. Internal Guidance 
Within the framework of natural selection, the isotropic character of variation 
determines that the directionality of change is a function of the external 
pressures acting on individuals. In other words, the evolution of populations 
follows the path of the proliferative superiority of their fittest representatives 
(Strickberger 2000, Gould 2002, Ayala 2007, Futuyma 2009). According to 
Futuyma, natural selection boils down to “any consistent difference in fitness 
among phenotypically different classes of biological entities” (Futuyma 2009: 
283). Contrary to this, self-organization is an internalist framework, where 
complexity comes for free and it is attained by means of internal dynamics 
alone. This contrast is well captured in the following quote from Gould: 
 
“Under internalist theories of evolution, environment, at most, holds 
power to derail the process not behaving properly […]. Under Darwinian 
functionalism, however, environment becomes an active partner in both 
the modes and directions of evolutionary change.”    (Gould 2002: 161)  
 
 Or in the words of Edelmann & Denton (2007: 588): “Self-organized ord-
er is spontaneous from within; the order of selection is additive from without”. 
 
4.5. Passive vs. Active Character of Matter 
This difference follows from previous ones: 
 
From the externalist viewpoint, living matter is a passive and a non-
intrinsically ordered entity that needs an external factor (natural selecti-
on) to acquire from. From the internalist perspective, living matter is an 
active entity capable of exhibiting order spontaneously. 
(Linde Medina 2010: 25)  
 
4.6. Open vs. Fixed Outcomes 
The isotropic character of variation and the instability of environmental 
conditions determine that natural selection can lead to any result within a 
given space of design (Dennet 1995). As illustrated by Goodwin (1994: 87): 
“Small variations are such that almost anything can happen—organisms can 
take any form, have any color, and eat any food, subject only to very broad 
constraints”. In the case of self-organization, systems robustly point to a 
specific point within a space of logical possibilities, one in which the attractor 
captures and stabilizes it. 
 
4.7. Historical Contingency vs. Generative Necessity 
Natural selection connects biology with history, while self-organization 
Biolinguistics    Forum   
 
136 
connects it with physics or chemistry. The point of view of the former is that of 
“historical narratives: Which species come from which ancestors under which 
circumstances” (Goodwin 1994: 88). The latter aims at explaining biological 
phenomena like other sciences “in which principles of organization allows one 
to understand the […] world in terms of regularities and general principles” 
(ibid.).  
 
4.8. Genocentrism vs. Epigeneticism 
Natural selection is commonly associated to the idea that evolutionary change 
is ultimately and chiefly anchored on genes (but see Okasha 2006). Thus, 
Dobzhansky’s (1937: 11) classic definition of evolution as “a change in the 
genetic composition of populations” still pervades Darwinian thought (to wit, 
see Futuyma 2009). Self-organization limits the centrality of genes, for self-
generated patterns of organization cannot be said to be a matter of genetic pre-
specification. Accordingly, “self-organized order is indeed genuinely epigen-
etic and not necessarily in the genes at all” (Edelmann & Denton 2007: 587). 
 
5. From Adam to Wallace: An Illustration of the Difference 
 
We want to conclude this clarification note with a particularly nice example 
taken from the field of evolutionary linguistics, where the suggestion is made 
that the evolution of language was originally bootstrapped thanks to a process 
of a selective character, but lastly accomplished through self-organization at 
the brain level. The case has been raised in two successive books by Bickerton 
(2009, 2014b), which offer a perfect illustration of what we have been trying to 
explain and document above. 
 According to Bickerton, “the transition from the alingual state that 
characterizes all other species to something that might qualify as a genuine 
precursor of language” (Bickerton 2010: 128) could only have happened as an 
adaptive response to some particular need of some hominid species. Con-
sequently, Bickerton elaborates an historical narrative that reads approxi-
mately like this: There was a time when some human ancestor entered a con-
frontational scavenging niche, where announcing one’s sightings and asking 
for help were imperative. Then some individuals accidentally developed the 
capacity of producing some noises while the image of their sightings still 
reverberated in the head. The capacity was inherited and accidentally more 
and more elaborated and successively inherited by the progeny of those 
individuals, until it became species typical. In due time, human ancestors were 
endowed with an inborn full-fledged capacity for displaced communication by 
means of a protolanguage (Bickerton 2009, 2014b: Chap. 4).  
 Bickerton’s proposal has been subject to strong criticism for different 
reasons (Balari & Lorenzo 2010a, Balari & Lorenzo 2010b, Arbib 2011, Clark 
2011), but this is not what is at issue here. What we want to emphasize is the 
value of Bickerton’s idea as a ‘textbook case’ of the application of natural 
selection to a particular aspect of the evolution of human mind: It presents the 
earliest stages of language evolution as due to a process of “long, slow 
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gestation” (Bickerton 2009: 212), that succeeded because it worked as an 
“evolutionary adaptation, just as much as walking upright, shedding body 
hair, or getting and opposable thumb” (p. 103)—in this particular case for 
“recruitment, that turns out to be the key word in the birth of language” (p. 
132). Even if they do not occur in a vacuum, but in a niche, adaptations are 
“genetic changes [that] can improve the ability of organisms to survive, 
reproduce, and, in animals, raise offspring” (p. 110). In dealing with processes 
like this one, “there’s no recourse […] but to tell just-so stories” (p. 218). 
 Bickerton explains the evolution of language proper from protolinguistic 
communication very differently, for the former shows properties that defy any 
clear adaptive motivation—Bickerton basically assumes Chomsky’s thesis of 
the underspecification of language for communicative uses and of the never 
ending array of communicative and non-communicative uses of language. He 
also explains that the most defying features of language regarding its conca-
tenative properties do not require a long story of evolutionary development by 
small increments. So he opts in this case for a solution inspired by the alter-
native model of self-organization: “The tasks that were required [for proto-
language to become true language] lie well within the brain’s powers of self-
organization” (Bickerton 2014b: 117; insert also from Bickerton, same page), 
and they were executed without “any kind of external pressure” (p. 119).  
 Bickerton’s complete account of the process is this: 
 
Protolanguage emerged because of triggering external events: confron-
tational scavenging led to the need for recruitment, which in turn necessi-
tated displaced communication, which eventually sufficed, in social 
animals with large brains, to create a crude and structureless proto-
language—all that nature needed. However, these processes necessarily 
caused symbolic items to be stored in the brain, and […] brain-internal 
processes […] were directly initiated by the brain’s need to deal with such 
items.                   (Bickerton 2014b: 115) 
 
 It is Bickerton himself who emphasizes that “syntactic infrastructure 
resulted from self-organizing activity within the brain itself” (Bickerton 2014b: 
106) and that “such changes do not need to be triggered by natural selection” 
(p. 107).  
 Bickerton’s goal in his last book is to explain how it is possible that lang-
uages seem universally to be so far away, from a formal point of view, of any 
imaginable human particular need, an aspect of what he refers to as ‘Wallace’s 
Problem’. His suggested solution is a multi-staged model of language evo-
lution: One of these stages resulted from “particular selective pressures operat-
ing specifically on human ancestors,” which were capable of releasing these 
people from the strictures of animal communication; another stage “consisted 
of purely brain-internal operations responding to unusual phenomena” that 
previous evolution had originated, but now with “no relation to the ecological 
needs of humans” (Bickerton 2014b: 262) and opened to them the never ending 
possibilities of language recursion. Let us conclude this note by simply noting 
how scrupulously Bickerton respects in this project the distinction that he 
simultaneously questions in the Biolinguistics piece (Bickerton 2014a).  





The aim of this paper has not been to defend any personal stance regarding the 
advantages of auto-organization over selection in explaining the evolution of 
the language faculty, but to correct Bickerton’s (2014a) misconception of the 
former, as if it were an evolutionary mechanism at the service of the latter. 
According to Bickerton, auto-organization auto-organizes variation, that selec-
tion further selects—our phrasing, of course. Here we have tried to show that 
fortunately enough, this has little to do with the status that current biological 
theories attribute to the said mechanisms. They rather conceptualize them as 
alternative mechanisms, a consequence of which is that the door is open to 
apply them separately to different aspects of a particular organism or organic 
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